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One of the literati having most actively participated in the struggle for his 
country’s emancipation, Huỳnh Thúc Kháng could not help complaining in 
the 1930s about the lot of Vietnam, in his words ‘a nation forced for a long 
time to forget itself’,1 as it appeared to him that no scope was given for 
moderate nationalism to take root or build mass strength. He was far then 
from imagining that, after 1945, he was to become the vice-president of a 
nation freed almost overnight from the yoke of colonialism. 
 Indeed, the war years and the period of Japanese occupation between 
1940 and 1945 had fundamentally changed Vietnam’s political environment. 
During this period, mass nationalist organisations could take root; among 
the revolutionary movements, the Việt Minh was able to seize power and 
establish some form of governmental legitimacy. Therefore it would seem 
meaningful to endeavour to observe how, behind the historical actors’ 
deeds and words throughout those decisive years, the conception of the 
Vietnamese nation was formulated, and in particular how the Việt Minh 
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The affirmation of the Vietnamese national revival 
 
In August 1940, Japan’s Foreign Minister Matsuoka Yōsuke declared 
Indochina to be a part of the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (Tōa 
Kyōeiken). In the eyes of Vietnamese patriots and intelligentsia, Matsuoka 
appeared as a promoter of the emancipation of East Asia. This led to a 
vision of a Vietnam independent from French rule within the framework of 
the Greater Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under Japan’s tutelage. Many 
Vietnamese might have believed in Japan’s motto ‘Asia for the Asians’ and 
the feasibility of an equal and peaceful confederation. But the expediential 
policy of ‘maintaining tranquillity’ in Indochina adopted by Japan by leaving 
the French regime intact until almost the very end did not fail to induce 
many a patriotic Vietnamese to ask why Japan professed to liberate Asia on 
the one hand, yet on the other hand retained the colonial government. 
Anyway, a complicated situation laden with ambiguities was created. The 
Japanese had promised to free the Asian nations from Western domination 
but at the same time they needed the French bureaucracy and police to 
insure the management of the economy and to maintain order. Admiral 
Decoux, appointed by the Vichy regime to be Indochina’s governor-general, 
did his best to preserve as much power as he could. Forced by 
circumstances to open more widely the Indochinese Civil Services to native 
officials, he tried to win over the Indochinese sovereigns and their elites by 
enhancing their prestige. At the same time, he launched a sports and youth 
movement with the intent of developing Marshal Pétain’s cult in Indochina 
and increase the people’s loyalty to France, and he advocated in Indochina 
the Vichy regime’s slogan ‘National Revolution’ and the virtues of ‘Work, 
Family, and Fatherland’. Drawing a distinction between the beneficient 
political force of patriotism and the subversive political force of 
nationalism, he endeavoured to enlist the support of the Indochinese, with 
the hope of thwarting Japanese propaganda. The cultural movement that 
resulted from his policy, however, gathered such a dynamic that it was no 
longer possible for the French to stop it, or to control it. 
 Vietnamese society had indeed gone through significant changes. The 
main social trend was the erosion of French supremacy and the loss of 
French prestige. The French colonial authorities’ inability to keep the 
Japanese out of their colony destroyed the myth of French invincibility 
which had persuaded most Vietnamese to acquiesce superficially in the face 
of French rule. A new generation of Vietnamese grew up within a context 
characterized by the decline of the long-held superiority of the white man, 




while native pride was rediscovered and patriotism encouraged. 
Paradoxically, the call by the Vichy regime for a French ‘national revival’ 
based upon patriotism, the family and work, and opposed to individualism, 
had anti-colonial effects, as Vietnamese intellectuals began to study their 
own society and its past for the secrets of a Vichy-like ‘national revival’ and 
the key to mass action they hoped it might contain. Different groups were 
created to prepare the cultural ground for a future of national 
independence. Such reviews as Thanh Nghị (Pure Opinion) or Tri Tân 
(Understand Modernity) for example devoted themselves from May-June 
1941 to researching the synthesis between Vietnamese national culture and 
western cultures, in order to modernize the former and propagate it by the 
means of a ‘silent revolution’.3 Radical thinkers associated with the Hàn 
Thuyên publishing house reinterpreted Vietnamese historical figures, in 
particular the Quang Trung emperor whom they saw as a representative of 
the peasant class struggling against feudalism. Writers such as Ngô Tất Tố 
began to describe the miseries of the peasants (Việc làng, Affairs of the 
Village). All of this contributed to a cultural effervescence without which 
the Revolution that was going to break out in August 1945 would have been 
nothing more than an ordinary military seizure of power.4
 Disrupting the long French rule of almost eighty years, the Japanese 
occupation helped revitalize various anti-French movements in Vietnam. In 
1939, Cường Ðể, to whom Japan had given shelter for nearly four decades, 
had already been encouraged to form the Việt Nam Phục Quốc Ðồng Minh 
Hội (League for the National Restoration of Vietnam), better known as the 
Phục Quốc League.5 Inside Vietnam, the Japanese also encouraged all 
political groups, including the Ðại Việt in north Vietnam, the Catholic bloc 
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led by Ngô Ðình Diệm and his brothers in central Vietnam, and the Cao 
Ðài and Hòa Hảo religious sects in Cochinchina, to join Cường Ðể’s 
organization. Leftwing Vietnamese, like Tạ Thu Thâu, who had serious 
doubts about the vision of an independent Vietnam within the Greater East 
Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, were by no means averse to discuss with some 
Japanese, such as the socialist writer Komatsu Kiyoshi, the possibility of 
forming ‘an anti-French national united front’.6 Komatsu enjoyed also a 
special friendship and trust with Phạm Ngọc Thạch, one of the leading 
members of the Communist-led resistance in Cochinchina.7 All those 
groups, including a portion of the remnants of the Việt Nam Quốc Dân 
Ðảng (Vietnamese Nationalist Party),8 and individuals that were supposed 
to be pro-Japanese were, however, isolated from each other because of their 
factionalism and regionalism. The Japanese apparently felt the necessity to 
put them together under the same banner; without their initiative and 
assistance, it might have been impossible for those scattered political groups 
to be unified. In September 1943, Trần Văn Ân, founder of the Phục Quốc 
branch at Saigon, rallied various groups in the south, including the Cao Ðài 
and Hòa Hảo religious sects, and expanded his and Cường Ðể’s organi-
sation to be a wider alliance, incorporating various nationalist groups. In the 
north, representatives of various groups got together and set up a unified 
organisation called the Ðại Việt Quốc Gia Liên Minh Hội (National League 
of the Great Viet) at the end of 1943 or at the beginning of 1944.9  
 But in the final analysis, it was to the Vietnamese Communists that 
the Japanese occupation, along with the preservation of the French colonial 
regime, had lent support in their rise to power by giving them their 
justification. The Vietnamese Communists were actually the ones who had 
consciously and effectively converted the craving for independence of the 
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Vietnamese population into a formidable force, and they now had an 
opportunity to blend their esoteric dogmas with the more easily understood 
nationalist cause of resistance to both the French and the Japanese. The 
fatal distraction of French colonialism gave them a chance to acquire a base 
area on the Sino-Vietnamese border, from where they concentrated on 
building up a revolutionary nucleus, and establishing contacts across the 
border with Chinese nationalist leaders, American and Free French liaison 
officers, and other anti-Japanese Vietnamese nationalists. 
 The adoption of communism, as one author wrote, ‘lent the 
Vietnamese drive for national liberation a determination and a solidity in the 
teeth of massive military opposition which are unique in modern history.’10 
It has been generally assumed that, until the introduction of communism, 
nationalism was equated squarely with anti-colonialism. Fighting French 
colonial rule in order to regain national independence, without letting 
questions of ideology or new political institutions obstruct the path of 
decolonisation, such was the basis of all prior anti-colonial movements. But, 
following the introduction of communism, nationalism became equated 
with ‘revolution’.11 The anti-colonialist rebel became the nationalist 
revolutionary. Not only did he want independence, he also advocated cách 
mệnh (revolution). A powerful concept in the Vietnamese political 
vocabulary, cách mệnh was complementary to the concept thiên mệnh 
(heavenly mandate) or the legitimacy to rule over others as conferred by a 
mandate from Heaven. In this sense to go into revolution meant to take 
away that mandate. In the usage of the Vietnamese Communists, however, 
cách mệnh assumed the connotation of the Western concept ‘revolution’ and 
meant more than just the removal of the right to rule. It also meant a total, 
radical transformation of the Vietnamese social, economic and political 
structure, involving both the destruction of the French colonial rule and the 
collaborative Vietnamese monarchy and the building of a new Vietnamese 
society. 
 In its early days, the Communist movement did not consider 
nationalism as capable by itself of saving Vietnam from bigger imperial 
enemies with modern weapons, partly because what Vietnamese mass 
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patriotism could be mobilized was largely anti-modern. Thus 
internationalism also became the antidote to the continuing entanglement of 
traditional patriotism with an energy limiting ‘feudalism’. The intention of 
erasing the old village culture was shown by the Communist stress upon 
literacy campaigns, and by the quickness with which the revolutionaries 
tried to celebrate the pantheon of their new post-feudal internationalism in 
the countryside. In 1931, during the unsuccessful ‘soviets’ uprising in north 
central Vietnam, Communist organisers compelled Vietnamese peasants to 
hold ‘anniversary weeks’ for Lenin, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg.12 
The ideas Hồ Chí Minh set forth previously in his Ðường Kách Mệnh – 
dividing revolution into a first stage of ‘national revolution’ (dân tộc kách 
mệnh), which would bring an end to foreign domination with the 
collaboration of several classes, and a second stage of world revolution (thế 
giới kách mệnh), during which peasants and workers throughout the world 
would unite as one family to destroy the capitalist system and bring about 
universal unity13 – were then rejected, including the need to create a broad 
alliance with progressive elements throughout the country and the 
establishment of an independent Vietnam. Slogans referring to the issue of 
national independence were to be supplemented by other appeals reflecting 
the issue of class struggle and world revolution. One particular goal to be 
attained would be to overthrow old rural social structures and eliminate 
private landlordism, in order to end the perceived antagonism between the 
old feudal state and the masses.  
 The experience of the 1930-31 revolts had nevertheless shown the 
Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) the great dangers of alienating the 
wealthy peasantry and landlords by prematurely emphasizing class issues, 
and of alienating the peasantry generally by taking a dogmatic attitude 
towards traditional culture. In 1941 the national liberation revolution (cách 
mạng giải phóng dân tộc) again received priority. The Eight Plenum of the ICP 
set up the League for the Independence of Vietnam (Việt Nam Ðộc Lập 
Ðồng Minh Hội), or Việt Minh, consisting of members from different social 
groups. The Việt Minh front, therefore, was initially conceived as a purely 
national liberation movement, not as a ‘New Democracy’ front fighting 
simultaneously for national liberation and against feudalism. The Party thus 
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shed its pre-1941 image of class struggle and proletarian internationalism, in 
favour of class cooperation, timeless patriotism, and sublimation within a 
national united front. In terms of relations with the villages, one of the 
results was the acceptance of the ambiguous coexistence of the modern 
revolution with traditional village patriotism, mobilized through the 
multiplication of ‘national salvation’ (cứu quốc) associations.14 Those were 
mass organizations, such as the National Salvation Cultural Association 
(Hội Văn Hóa Cứu Quốc) established in 1943 with ICP cadres’ assistance to 
recruit urban intellectuals to the Việt Minh cause and find ways of 
insinuating anti-French, anti-Japanese propaganda into legal newspapers and 
journals, the Peasants’ National Salvation Association, the Students’ 
National Salvation Association, the Women’s National Salvation 
Association, the Teenagers’ National Salvation Association, and so on. 
Together, these associations acted as a shield to the Party; individually, each 
organization translated esoteric Communist slogans into the language of its 
group’s members. In theory, then, the Việt Minh front was the coalition of 
these National Salvation Associations, through which it could impulse a 
broad national movement, uniting large numbers of Vietnamese regardless 
of their politics, and reaching down into the masses. The theme of unity and 
national salvation (even the Việt Minh’s main newspaper bore the title Cứu 
Quốc) enabled thus the Việt Minh to involve local populations in its cause 
and the socio-economic reforms it proposed. Talk of a ‘genuine world 
republic’ faded; the doctrine of a people’s war, requiring the total 
involvement of the Vietnamese population, invoked a revolution based on 
nationalism and the national popular culture. The ideology of nationalism 
was then given an important role in Vietnam’s political legitimisation. To 
strengthen its claim to legitimacy, the Communist movement leadership 
capitalized on the compatibility between modern and traditional Vietnamese 
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values, seeking to fuse the legitimacy of the state socialist system with the 
legitimacy of Vietnam as a nation.  
 Yet, for the majority of the rural population, the language of modern 
nationalism and socialism required translation. Nationalism was therefore 
linked with traditional Vietnamese patriotic spirit (tinh thần yêu nước); to 
energize the resistance to French colonialism, the memory of resistance 
against the Chinese invasion and the Vietnamese fighting spirit (tinh thần 
đấu tranh) was evoked, and the Trưng sisters, Triệu Ẩu, Trần Hưng Ðạo, Lê 
Lợi, Quang Trung, et cetera, all of whom fought Chinese invasion, were 
called ‘anh hùng dân tộc’, or national heroes. In discussing socialism, complex 
Marxist-Leninist terms were avoided; socialism was defined as a system in 
which the Vietnamese would ‘have enough to eat and enough clothes to 
wear in cold weather’, a system in which there was no human exploitation. 
 In addition to relying on the rural population to achieve its goals, the 
leadership also tried to enter into an alliance with both non-communist and 
communist intellectuals trained during the French colonial period.15 Because 
of the Party's anti-nationalist and anti-bourgeois revolutionary line of the 
1930s, the Communists had failed for more than a decade to attract 
students, intellectuals and other urban petit-bourgeois elements into their 
ranks. To remedy this situation, the ICP resolved during its Plenum of 
February 1943 to launch a ‘cultural front’ (mặt trận văn hóa) to enlist the 
support of these urban elements.16 A document entitled Ðề cương văn hóa 
Việt Nam (Theses on Vietnamese culture) was the direct consequence of 
this resolution.17 Published at a time when both the French colonial 
government and the Japanese occupying forces were outdoing each other in 
competing for popular Vietnamese support, it was a deliberate attempt to 
compete with the French and the Japanese for the collaboration of 
Vietnamese intellectuals. Containing less than 1,500 words, Ðề cương văn hóa 
was a brief document, prepared in the form of an outline, with ideas left 
incompletely developed. Divided into four main parts, this document 
summarized Vietnamese literary and cultural development during the early 
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decades of the twentieth century; called attention to the danger of nefarious 
‘fascist’ influences of the French and the Japanese; discussed the importance 
of a cultural revolution and the relationship between a political and a 
cultural revolution; and elaborated the urgent tasks of Vietnamese writers 
and artists. It emphasized the importance of Party leadership in this cultural 
revolution. A new Vietnamese culture, ‘national in character and democratic 
in content’, was thus postulated, and the campaign for this new culture was 
to be based on three principles: 1) national (opposing all enslaving and 
colonialist influences, allowing Vietnamese culture to develop 
independently); 2) mass (opposing every tendency that would go against the 
masses or away from the masses); 3) scientific (opposing anything that 
would render cultural activities anti-scientific and counter-progressive). To 
this end, a socialist culture was to be created, in which all cultural activity 
was to be measured according to the degree that it stimulated 
simultaneously a sense of patriotism, mass consciousness, and scientific 
objectivity. This meant the adoption of a strict position that allowed no 
concept of literary and artistic ideological neutrality: the cultural medium 
(the printed word, music, painting, film, et cetera) had no value in itself, 
except in its utility as a conveyor of an ideological message. Neutrality 
would be considered immoral, if not as an act of treason, when the country 
was caught in a struggle for survival as an independent nation.18 
 For Communist activists, the Ðề cương văn hóa became an important 
guideline in their propaganda activities. Several non-Communist writers – 
                                                 
18 The themes of Ðề cương văn hóa Việt Nam were to be elaborated further in July 1948 in an 
official report of the Central Committee of the ICP (then non-existent on paper) read by 
Trường Chinh, the Party's Secretary-General, at the Second National Congress. The report, 
entitled Chủ nghĩa Mác và văn hóa Việt Nam – Marxism and Vietnamese culture (see Trường 
Chinh, Chủ nghĩa Mác và văn hóa Việt Nam (second edition, Hanoi 1974) – approached 
frontally the many theoretical issues concerning Vietnamese literature and the arts: the 
relationship between material life and spiritual life, between economic and political reality 
and cultural development; possibility of artistic neutrality; relationship between art and 
propaganda, et cetera. It repeated all the themes that had been outlined in the earlier 
document: the need for a cultural revolution to complement the political revolution; the 
denial of literary and artistic neutrality in a society fighting for political survival; the necessity 
of socialist realism as the ‘correct’ approach to literary and artistic expression; and finally, the 
importance of the three guiding principles of the Vietnamese revolutionary culture: national, 
mass, and scientific. As a statement of objective of a Communist party-in-power, this 
document was to become an authoritative guideline for Vietnamese literary and artistic 
endeavour for many years to come, channeling Vietnamese writers and artists into one 
direction, that of serving the prevalent revolutionary line of the Communist party. 




such as Nam Cao, Ngô Tất Tố, Tô Hoài, and Nguyên Hồng – later claimed 
to be much influenced by this document.19 With it, the goal of creating a 
‘new culture’ was proclaimed by the Việt Minh. Nevertheless, care was 
taken in the ensuing years to avoid that the educational efforts in the 
countryside to generate a new culture and new attitudes should not be 
couched in terms of class struggle, and that peasant and minority 
superstitions and cultural traditions should be treated with respect. Educa-
tional cadres were encouraged to go out of their way to understand and 
respect local customs in order to ‘create an atmosphere of sympathy’; only 
on this basis should they then put forward new ideas and encourage the 
people ‘to abate their superstitions’. The point that the revolutionary 
struggle at this stage was purely patriotic and had no class-based ingredient, 
was going to be given even greater force in November 1945, when the 
Indochina Communist Party was officially ‘dissolved’. Moreover, being 
conscious of the need to compensate for ‘breadth’ of patriotic appeal by 
‘depth’ of political education, it was understood that if the ideological 
coherence of the revolution was to be preserved, the leadership pursued 
what might be called a policy of ‘anti-feudalism by stealth’, involving among 
other things a campaign for literacy, the introduction of universal 
elementary education, and recognition of the equality of nationalities and 
the equality of sexes.20 Clearly, the new culture was not simply designed by 
the Communists to ‘democratise’ the Vietnamese countryside and wipe out 
feudal attitudes; it was also designed to generate at the grass-roots level the 
beginnings of an irresistible momentum towards a socialist mentality and a 
socialist society. As Trường Chinh would put it, Vietnamese society was 
undergoing a ‘metamorphosis’ from the age-old Confucian values of the 
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The blurred image of the new state of Vietnam 
 
By the turn of 1945, the Japanese judged that a coup de force against the 
French in Indochina would be indispensable, and on 26 February 1945 a 
final plan for the coup was agreed upon, which projected to purge the 
French and give ‘immediate independence’ to the three Indochinese 
nations. After the coup had been actually carried out on 9 March 1945, Lt. 
General Tsuchihashi Yūitsu, the newly appointed commander in chief of 
the occupation forces in Indochina, suggested to Bảo Ðại to declare the 
abolition of the 1884 protectorate treaty.21
 Two days after the Japanese coup, on 11 March 1945, a royal 
ordinance was promulgated, acknowledging Japan’s ‘liberation’ of Vietnam 
and noting proudly that there was now an independent Vietnamese 
government after eighty years of French protectorate: 
 
In view of the world situation and of the situation of Asia in 
particular, the government of Vietnam proclaims publicly that as of 
today, the protectorate treaty with France is abolished and that the 
country takes back its rights to independence. 
 Vietnam will endeavour with its own means to develop so as to 
merit the status of an independent state and will follow the directives 
of the common Manifesto of Greater East Asia to bring the help of 
its resources to common prosperity. 
  Therefore the government of Vietnam has confidence in Japan’s 
loyalty and is determined to collaborate with this country to reach the 
aforesaid objective. (...) 
   
 Huế, the 27th day of the 1st month of the 20th Bảo Ðại year.22 
 
The declaration was followed on 17 March by Bảo Ðại’s first edict as an 
‘independent’ Emperor, which established the principle dân vi quí, meaning 
‘the most precious thing is the people’, as the basis for his reign from that 
point on. The expression was borrowed from Mencius: ‘the people are 
precious, the country is ranked second, and the ruler is of little value.’ The 
                                                 
21 It was widely touted then that Cường Ðể would make a triumphant return to Vietnam to 
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in Vietnam’s domestic affairs, and that Bảo Ðại’s fate should not be decided by Japan, but by 
a formal institution such as Vietnam’s national assembly. 
22 S.M. Bao Dai, Le dragon d’Annam (Paris 1980) 104.  




ordinance stated that Bảo Ðại would take control of the government and, 
with the help of men of talent and virtue, work to rebuild the country.23 
This was clearly a historic moment and historic opportunity. However, Bảo 
Ðại admitted in his memoirs that the situation was far from favourable, as 
his bureaucracy, weakened over the years by French control, simply did not 
have the capacity to run the country: ‘For many, the idea of independence is 
linked to the disappearance of all regulation. Taxes are no longer collected, 
protests spread. Authority deteriorates. (...) Yet the government does not 
have at its disposal any force to assure order. Devoid of officers, the police 
services and the militia are incapable of intervening. Only the Japanese 
forces would be in a position to restore order, but I refuse to ask them to 
do so.’24 
 At any rate, the significance of the circumstances did not escape Bảo 
Ðại. ‘We have seen the realization of the dream which patriots have held for 
so long,’ he exclaimed, as he vowed that his own wish was ‘to cultivate a 
national and patriotic spirit and guide the youth in taking responsibility for 
opening up the country, raising the people’s standard of living, and increas-
ing production.’25 Regretting that he had been unable to have direct 
contacts with ‘the nation’ as he had wished, he challenged the Vietnamese 
to ‘unite into one national bloc’ in order to work toward the ‘total 
independence’ which they would have to earn. In an address read on 8 May 
1945, he promised a constitution whereby the ‘co-operation between the 
ruler and the people’ would mark the transition from absolute monarchy to 
a form of government where the people’s rights are clearly recognized.’26 
 Bảo Ðại also appealed to the Allies to acknowledge the independence 
of Viet Nam. As the Gaullist Government had made its intention to restore 
the French colonial system in Indochina clear through its declaration of 24 
March 1945,27 only a fortnight after the Japanese coup, he sent a special 
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message to General de Gaulle, a message vibrant with patriotic emotion and 
declaring without ambiguity his nation’s will for self-determination:  
 
I am addressing the people of France, the country of my youth. I am 
addressing also her leader and liberator, and I wish to speak as a 
friend rather than as a chief of state. 
 You have suffered too much during four deadly year for you not 
to understand that the Vietnamese people, who possess twenty 
centuries of history and a often glorious past, no longer want to, no 
longer can undergo any foreign rule or administration. 
 You would understand still better if you could see what is 
happening here, if you could feel this desire for independence which 
is in everyone's heart and which no human force can any longer 
restrain. Even if you come to re-establish a French administration 
here, it will no longer be obeyed: each village will be a nest of 
resistance; each former collaborator an enemy, and your officials and 
colonists will themselves ask to leave this atmosphere which they will 
be unable to breathe. 
 I beg you to understand that the only way to safeguard French 
interests and France’s spiritual influence in Indochina is to recognize 
frankly the independence of Vietnam, and to give up any idea of re-
establishing French sovereignty or a French administration under any 
form whatsoever. 
  We could so easily reach an agreement and become friends, if you 
would cease to claim to become our masters again.28 
 
It remains that, while reclaiming Vietnam’s rights of independence, Bảo 
Ðại’s proclamation said that Vietnam now considered itself to be an 
‘element’ in Japan’s Greater East Asian system. His declaration of 
independence, on the other hand, directly concerned only north and central 
Vietnam. Although it inspired hopes in Cochinchina, it had for the time 
being no formal effect on the political situation in that region. Reminding 
the Vietnamese that Japan's definition of ‘independence’ was a severely 
limited one, Governor Minoda would state on 29 March 1945 that no one 
should misunderstand the fact that Cochinchina was under Japanese 
                                                                                                             
(See Isoart, L’Indochine française 1940-1945, 46). From the start, the French government’s 
declaration was totally outdated and contained all the germs of the future disagreements 
between the French and the different Vietnamese parties. The unity of Vietnam was not 
acknowledged, and the terms ‘nation’ or ‘state’ appeared nowhere. 
28 Bao Dai, Le dragon d’Annam, 114-115. 




authority. Thus, the Japanese failed to recognize the critical divergence 
between their own notion of independence (dokuritsu) and the independence 
that the vast majority of the Vietnamese population were looking for: the 
concept of an independent Vietnam that was free from French colonial rule 
but functioned within Japan’s Greater East Asia was essentially 
incompatible with the ideals of most Vietnamese, for whom independence 
should not only be from France, but also from any form of foreign rule.  
 Trần Trọng Kim, a respected figure who had been in exile since the 
beginning of 1944, was offered the premiership, and his cabinet was formed 
on 17 April. The Trần Trọng Kim government’s first policy statement was 
to call on Vietnamese of all social classes to unite and develop their patriotic 
spirit. It promised to free imprisoned ‘patriots’, to do everything possible so 
that ‘politicians still in exile’ could return home, and vowed to avoid abuses 
and corruption, to strengthen the country's independence, and to ignore 
personal or partisan interests.29 However, the government of Trần Trọng 
Kim was, in a sense, living on borrowed time from the moment of its 
inception, since much of its political authority and all of its military security 
were tied to the Japanese – there was no Ministry of Defence in the 
Cabinet, and the government general, now taken over by the Japanese, 
continued to take decisions concerning Vietnam. Moreover, the regime was 
confronted with a cataclysmic famine in the north, caused by a combination 
of bad weather, French and Japanese requisitions of peasants’ rice and the 
disruption of transportation between various parts of the country caused by 
Allied bombing of Indochina.30 The worsening of the famine to crisis 
proportions coincided with the Japanese granting of independence to 
Vietnam in March, so that the problem of hunger in the north was an 
ongoing concern during the early weeks of the existence of the Trần Trọng 
Kim government. Despite serious attempts made to deal with the famine, 
bringing at least partial relief, 500,000 to 600,000 people died by June 1945 
in the Red River Delta alone. 
Having broken as much as possible with the administration established by 
the French, the new government lacked most of the resources and the 
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qualified manpower necessary to build up a comparable system of its own. 
While the regime was able to implement some measures aimed at 
strengthening its independence from the colonial legacy, these changes were 
rather more psychological than structural. For example, the name ‘Vietnam’ 
was used officially to designate the entire country (implying the desire of 
territorial unification), and in French, which was still widely used, 
‘Vietnamien’ came to replace the somewhat loathed term ‘Annamite’. Huế 
was restored to its pre-colonial name of Thuận Hóa. Trần Trọng Kim 
himself selected a national flag and national anthem which, although 
probably more influenced by Confucian tradition than many young 
nationalists would have preferred, were at least symbolic of Vietnam as a 
unit. 
 This is not to say that the regime did not accomplish anything 
beyond the purely symbolic. Initial steps toward fiscal, educational, and 
judicial reforms were taken, while at the same time, outlets that had not 
existed under colonial rule were provided for nationalist sentiment. There 
was renewed attention to heroic figures from Vietnamese history, and new 
freedom of the press allowed the expression of anti-French feelings of 
many kinds. Mass political participation was now heartily encouraged – 
including street demonstrations, meetings and marches propagating a spirit 
of cultural and political independence. On a more concrete level, the 
mobilization of youth begun by the Decoux regime was continued, but the 
focus of loyalty was now ‘Vietnam’ rather than ‘French Indochina’. 
Through the Thanh Niên (Youth) movement created under the initiative of 
the Minister of Youth, Phan Anh, and his assistant, Tạ Quang Bửu, youth 
groups were formed not only in urban centres but also in rural areas. In 
Cochinchina, the Japanese also permitted the formation of the Thanh Niên 
Tiền Phong (Youth Vanguard) led by Phạm Ngọc Thạch. The Thanh Niên 
programme thus mobilized tens of thousands of youngsters who later rallied 
to the Việt Minh flag (in the name of national independence and unity 
rather than Marxism-Leninism). 
 Trần Trọng Kim got down also to a Vietnamisation process ranging 
from the adoption of Vietnamese romanised script as the official language 
in government offices and in classrooms to the change of street, city and 
regional names (such words as Annam or Trung Kỳ, Tonkin or Bắc Kỳ, 
Cochinchina or Nam Kỳ were gradually replaced by the new terms Trung 
Bộ, Bắc Bộ, Nam Bộ), the free formation of nationalist parties to a 
Vietnamisation of the French colonial administration through the 




replacement of French officials by Vietnamese bureaucrats. This 
Vietnamisation process was however complicated by the political issues of 
independence and territorial unity. Not prepared to grant Vietnam 
immediate and complete independence, Japan did not even recognize 
Vietnam diplomatically. Yet, Trần Trọng Kim enjoyed considerable 
autonomy in North and Central Vietnam, as long as he did not obstruct 
Japan’s strategic goals. His main preoccupation was to try to win 
concessions from the Japanese that would enable his government to present 
a more convincing face to the public. Already in June nationalist groups 
were publicly criticizing the government for failing to reintegrate 
Cochinchina with the rest of Vietnam, for not obtaining administrative 
control of the cities of Hanoi, Haiphong and Ðà-nẵng (Tourane), and for 
allowing the Japanese to retain the different services of the former 
Gouvernement général de l’Indochine (Sûreté, Post Office, Finance, Railways, 
Public Works, Education, Justice). In July, Trần Trọng Kim was able to 
work out a timetable for the transfer of all the above powers except control 
of Cochinchina with General Tsuchihashi, the commander in chief of the 
Japanese occupation forces in Indochina. Then, in the first days of August, 
Tsuchihashi agreed to the appointment of a Vietnamese viceroy for 
Cochinchina, and Bảo Đại officially designated Nguyễn Văn Sâm to that 
position on 14 August.31
 But the country, on the verge of collapse and faced with rising 
anarchy,32 urgently needed charismatic leadership, federative political 
conceptions, as well as administrative experience, things that Trần Trọng 
Kim and his government did not seem to possess. Considered up to then to 
be a king who reigned but did not govern, Bảo Ðại could not possibly 
attract mass support. Although Trần Trọng Kim had great moral influence 
among the intellectuals, he was far from being a political leader suitable for 
such a volatile situation. Among his associates, there were several talented 
men, but they were more technicians than politicians, having not acquired 
much experience in mobilizing politically mass movements. They could not 
fully understand the extent of the revolutionary forces already at work, 
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whereas there was an alternative government being formed in the 
mountains that did understand revolution and indeed was doing everything 
possible to give the revolutionary wheel a firm push. 
 Neither did Trần Trọng Kim’s government have the means to bring 
about effective national unity. It is true that, in order to give it support, the 
Japanese sponsored the unification of various Ðại Việt formations in North 
Vietnam and created the Tân Việt Nam Ðảng (New Vietnam Party) in 
Central Vietnam. But not all pro-Japanese groups stood behind Trần Trọng 
Kim. The most hostile were the Catholic ‘dissidents’ in Huế, led by Ngô 
Ðình Diệm and his brothers; rumour had it that Cường Ðể and Ngô Ðình 
Diệm were to take over power when Japan granted Vietnam its true 
independence. 
 Faced with mounting difficulties, as well as with the perspective of 
Japan losing the war and the disturbing information of the Việt Minh’s 
successes especially in the countryside, the Trần Trọng Kim government 
even thought of resigning. At the same time, Bảo Đại accepted the cabinet 
members’ request to invite the Việt Minh, which obtained allied support, to 
form a new government. Thus, before the capitulation of Japan, the 
decision of transferring authority to the revolutionary forces had already 
been reached. By their reluctance to encourage and concede Vietnamese 
independence, the Japanese had therefore helped to discredit the pro-
Japanese nationalist groups that they would have preferred to leave in 
command in Vietnam. On the other hand, Japanese forces still in control of 
Indochina after Japan’s surrender might have crushed the Việt Minh forces, 
had Bảo Ðại and Trần Trọng Kim requested them to do so. Bảo Ðại 
rejected nevertheless such an extreme measure, and agreed to transfer his 
power to the Việt Minh because he imagined that, with American support 
secured by Hồ Chí Minh, independence would be guaranteed. In the end, 
even a Vietnamese government led by Communists who had been generally 
anti-Japanese seemed to the Japanese preferable to returning the country to 
the French. This benevolent neutrality observed by the Japanese explains 
the ease with which the Việt Minh could come to power. 
 
 
The national discourse after the August Revolution 
 
In a situation of political vacuum created by the removal of the French 
colonial administration, the weakness of the Vietnamese substitute 




government, the absence of a mass nationalist organization ready to fill the 
empty political space (in some areas of the south, however, local 
organizations such as the religious sects Cao Ðài and Hòa Hảo formed 
what amounted to local warlord governments), and the concentration of 
Japanese minds on an increasingly desperate military situation, the Việt 
Minh seized the opportunity to spread out networks of ‘liberation 
committees’ from their northern base. The Japanese did not bother to send 
their troops into the northern area and the Việt Minh took over the region, 
expanding their ‘liberated zone’ beyond Cao Bằng to include seven 
provinces. They issued a proclamation calling on the people to rise up 
against the Japanese ‘and make of Vietnam a strong country, free and 
independent.’ Denouncing Bảo Ðại’s proclamation of independence as 
‘bogus independence’ (độc lập bánh vẽ), they warned: ‘In overthrowing the 
French yoke, the Japanese plan to occupy our country and turn it into a 
Japanese colony where they will reserve to themselves the monopoly of 
plundering our people, abusing our women, slaying our patriots. They are 
not here to liberate our people. They are here to seize our rice stocks, our 
cotton, our oil; they will arrest all our young men and turn them into 
Japanese cannon-fodder.’33 The famine in the north provided the Việt Minh 
with the opportunity of eliminating the anti-communist village leaders, and 
building a mass movement of political and social salvation in the 
countryside. ‘National independence’ and ‘seize paddy stocks to save the 
people from starvation’ became the slogans around which the people were 
mobilized. Underground cadres infiltrated nearly all ‘patriotic’ organs and 
associations. Besides, the status and credibility of the Việt Minh movement 
was greatly enhanced by the fact that its Communist leaders had, since 
1941, maintained a firm anti-French (the colonial enemy) and anti-Japanese 
(the fascist enemy) stance, and, as a result, had established military links 
with the Allies. 
 Events were moving rapidly towards the climax of the August 
Revolution. Conditions were ripe for general insurrection, and the Việt 
Minh were on the verge of taking power. There was no effective 
government to forestall them, and no organized independent group to 
compete with them. As a result, the Việt Minh could be seen by many as a 
broad national movement, uniting large numbers of Vietnamese regardless 
                                                 
33 Hammer, The struggle for Indochina 1940-1955, 99. 




of their politics, and reaching down to the masses.34 Not only could they 
count on Võ Nguyên Giáp’s small army for military support, the young 
people who had been trained under Phan Anh and Tạ Quang Bửu were 
very eager to show their muscle as well. Both men were to become 
members of the new revolutionary government and the young people they 
organized were in the forefront of the revolution, imbued with nationalist 
ideals. The Japanese having capitulated on 15 August 1945, Hồ Chí Minh 
judged the moment right to seize power openly, through the agency of the 
liberation committees. Supported by massive demonstrations in provincial 
capitals, the Viêt Minh took control of the whole country between 19 and 
25 August. As Võ Nguyên Giáp and his soldiers moved into Hanoi, there 
were demonstrations in the city celebrating independence. Bảo Ðại’s 
representative, Phan Kế Toại, surrendered his authority to the 
revolutionaries; and the Viêt Minh youth groups and militia took over the 
city, while the Japanese stood by. 
 In the old imperial city, Bảo Đại watched these developments 
uncertainly. There was no longer a government at Huế, and Huế too now 
had its revolutionary committee. Rapidly, Bảo Đại announced that he was 
prepared to turn over power to the Việt Minh if that was the people’s wish. 
After having received a telegram from Hanoi informing him that a 
provisional revolutionary government had been established and asking him 
to turn over power, he responded that he was ready to abdicate immediately 
but that he wished to have a formal ceremony for the transfer of power in 
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order to fulfil his responsibility to the people. He then proceeded to 
promulgate his edict of abdication, dated 25 August 1945: 
 
The happiness of the people of Vietnam! 
The Independence of Vietnam! 
 
To achieve these ends, we have declared ourselves ready for any 
sacrifice and we desire that our sacrifice be useful to the fatherland. 
 Considering that the unity of all our compatriots is at this time our 
country's need, we recalled to our people on August 22: ‘In this 
decisive hour of our national history, union means life and division 
means death.’ 
 Considering the powerful democratic spirit growing in the north 
of our kingdom, we feared that conflict between north and south 
could be inevitable if we were to wait for a National Congress to 
decide us, and we know that this conflict, if it ever occurred, would 
plunge our people into suffering and would play the game of the 
invaders. 
 We cannot but have a certain feeling of melancholy upon thinking 
of our glorious ancestors who fought without respite for 400 years to 
aggrandize our country from Thuận Hóa to Hà Tiên. We cannot but 
experience a certain regret while thinking of our twenty years’ reign, 
during which we were in the impossibility of being of help 
appreciably to our country. 
 Despite this, and strong in our convictions, we have decided to 
abdicate and we transfer power to the Democratic Republican 
Government. 
 Upon leaving our throne, we have only three wishes to express: 
  
 1) We request that the new Government take care of the dynastic 
temples and royal tombs. 
 2) We request the new Government to deal fraternally with all the 
parties and groups which have fought for the independence of our 
country even though they have not closely followed the popular 
movement; to do this in order to give them the opportunity to 
participate in the reconstruction of the country and to demonstrate 
that the new regime is built upon the absolute union of the entire 
population. 
 3) We invite all parties and groups, all classes of society, as well as 
the royal family, to show solidarity in unreserved support of the 
democratic Government in order to consolidate the national 
independence 





 As for us, during twenty years’ reign, we have known much 
bitterness. We would rather live as a simple citizen of an independent 
state than as the king of a subjugated nation. Henceforth, we shall be 
happy to be a free citizen in an independent country. We shall allow 
no one to abuse our name or the name of the royal family in order to 
sow dissent among our compatriots. 
 
 Long live the independence of Vietnam! 
 Long live our Democratic Republic! 
 Huế, Kiên-Trung Palace, 25 August 1945.35 
 
Read to a large crowd during the formal abdication ceremony held on 30 
August in front of the Ngọ Môn gate in Huế, Bảo Ðại’s abdication edict 
was all the more moving as it was the first time for the Emperor to be called 
upon to speak in public. 
 Bảo Ðại also promulgated an edict directed at the royal family.36 
Evoking the 388 years of history since the first Nguyễn Lord established 
himself in Thuận Hóa, he acknowledged that it would bring great sadness to 
all of them if he were to give up the inheritance of these four centuries of 
rule. However, he reminded them of his attachment to the dân vi quí 
philosophy and of his vow that he would rather be a citizen in a free 
country than the ruler of an enslaved one. Compared to the sacrifice of 
‘hundreds of thousands’ of compatriots who had lost their lives for their 
country over the past eighty years, he said, his abdication meant little. He 
called on the members of the royal family to support the new government 
and preserve Vietnam’s independence in order to demonstrate true loyalty 
(trung) to him and filial piety (hiếu) toward their dynastic ancestors. 
 Both of these texts made clear Bảo Ðại’s will to step aside on behalf 
of the superior interest of the nation, threatened with a civil war that he 
clear-sightedly predicted. He affirmed also unambiguously that he was 
transmitting voluntarily his mandate, lending in this way legitimacy to the 
regime that was to succeed him.37 Yet, few have ever thought of comparing 
the deeply nationalist accent of Bảo Ðại’s discourse with the declaration of 
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the foundation of the new Democratic Republic of Vietnam read by Hồ Chí 
Minh on 2 September 1945, to a huge tumultuous crowd of Vietnamese in 
Hanoi as well as to the nation and the world at large:  
 
‘We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created 
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.’ 
 This immortal statement is extracted from the Declaration of 
Independence of the United States of America in 1776. Understood 
in the broader sense, this means: ‘All peoples on the earth are born 
equal; every person has the right to live to be happy and free.’ 
 The Declaration of Human and Civic Rights proclaimed by the 
French Revolution in 1789 likewise propounds: ‘Every man is born 
equal and enjoys free and equal rights.’ 
 These are undeniable truths. 
 Yet, during and throughout the last eighty years, the French 
imperialists, abusing the principles of ‘freedom, equality and 
fraternity,’ have violated the integrity of our ancestral land and 
oppressed our countrymen. Their deeds run counter to the ideals of 
humanity and justice. 
 In the political field, they have denied us every freedom. They 
have enforced upon us inhuman laws. They have set up three 
different political regimes in Northern, Central and Southern 
Vietnam (Tonkin, Annam, and Cochinchina) in an attempt to disrupt 
our national, historical and ethnical unity. 
 They have built more prisons than schools. They have callously 
ill-treated our fellow-compatriots. They have drowned our 
revolutions in blood. 
 They have sought to stifle public opinion and pursued a policy of 
obscurantism on the largest scale; they have forced upon us alcohol 
and opium in order to weaken our race. 
 In the economic field, they have shamelessly exploited our people, 
driven them into the worst misery and mercilessly plundered our 
country. 
 They have ruthlessly appropriated our rice fields, mines, forests 
and raw materials. They have arrogated to themselves the privilege of 
issuing banknotes, and monopolized all our external commerce. They 
have imposed hundreds of unjustifiable taxes, and reduced our 
countrymen, especially the peasants and petty tradesmen, to extreme 
poverty. 




 They have prevented the development of native capital 
enterprises; they have exploited our workers in the most barbarous 
manner. 
 In the autumn of 1940, when the Japanese fascists, in order to 
fight the Allies, invaded Indochina and set up new bases of war, the 
French imperialists surrendered on bended knees and handed over 
our country to the invaders. 
 Subsequently, under the joint French and Japanese yoke, our 
people were literally bled white. The consequences were dire in the 
extreme. From Quảng-Trị up to the North, two millions of our 
countrymen died from starvation during the first months of this year. 
 On March 9th, 1945, the Japanese disarmed the French troops. 
Again the French either fled or surrendered unconditionally. Thus, in 
no way have they proved capable of ‘protecting’ us; on the contrary, 
within five years they have twice sold our country to the Japanese. 
 In fact, since the autumn of 1940, our country ceased to be a 
French colony and became a Japanese possession. 
 After the Japanese surrender, our people, as a whole, rose up and 
proclaimed their sovereignty and founded the Democratic Republic 
of Vietnam. 
 The truth is that we have wrung back our independence from 
Japanese hands and not from the French. 
 For these reasons, we, the members of the Provisional 
Government of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, solemnly 
declare to the world: ‘Vietnam has the right to be free and inde-
pendent and, in fact, has become free and independent. The people 
of Vietnam decide to mobilize all their spiritual and material forces 
and to sacrifice their lives and property in order to safeguard their 
right of Liberty and Independence.38  
 
This declaration, which was the formulation of a political entity, was 
designed to set the overall tone of the government for both domestic and 
foreign consumption.39 For the Vietnamese people, it evoked the symbols 
of unity in a national framework and the fundamental right to socio-
economic welfare within a collective whole to state that independence was 
an accomplished fact, to be defended totally, without compromise.40 
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Reflecting both the historical contingencies and the indigenous political 
culture, it also emphasized how the French had lost their mandate as 
‘protector’ through their subservience to Japan and their partial 
responsibility for the death of up to two million Vietnamese. For the Allies, 
the declaration stated that Vietnam’s independence corresponded to what 
their leaders had pledged at international conferences and that the country 
therefore ought to be granted recognition. The emphasis on the provisional 
character was thus not related only to the need for national elections and a 
constitution, but also signalled to foreign governments that it would be 
possible to negotiate longer-term arrangements. 
 However, although the Communists carefully played down class 
contradictions within Vietnam at this stage, they provided, in Clive J. 
Christie’s terms, an almost textbook example of the application of the 
criteria of ‘antagonistic’ and ‘non-antagonistic’ contradictions in the 
international sphere.41 First of all, it was vitally important to identify 
international forces that were fundamentally hostile to the objectives of the 
Vietnamese revolution – that is, where there was an inherent ‘contradiction’ 
between these forces and the Vietnamese revolution – and at the same time 
to distinguish, at any given time, between those contradictions that were 
‘antagonistic’ and those that were temporarily ‘non-antagonistic’. This 
perspective was important for the conduct of foreign policy, since in 
practical terms it enabled the Vietnamese revolutionary government to build 
alliances and isolate particular enemies, while at the same time maintaining a 
proper Marxist historical perspective on the course of events. It was also 
important internally, since it gave local Việt Minh cadres a theoretical base 
on which to understand that today’s friends could become tomorrow’s 
enemies. 
 In March 1945, the fault-line between ‘antagonistic’ and ‘non-
antagonistic’ contradiction had been placed between the Japanese and other 
world forces of fascism on the antagonistic side, and all ‘anti-fascist’ forces 
on the other. In the eyes of the Communist leadership, therefore, while the 
Free French government fully intended to resume colonial control in 
Vietnam, and while there was an inherent ‘contradiction’ between Free 
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France and revolutionary Vietnam in the long term, in the short term the 
Free French and Vietnamese revolutionaries had a common interest in 
ousting Japan from Indochina; therefore, their relationship at this stage was 
‘non-antagonistic’. 
 Once Japan surrendered, however, the axis of antagonistic and non-
antagonistic contradiction shifted. The principal contradiction was now no 
longer that between global fascism and global anti-fascist democracy, but 
between colonialism and national liberation: that is, between the French 
government and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. This change in the 
international situation was signalled in the wording of the declaration. By 
quoting from the American Declaration of Independence, with its 
quintessential statement of ‘bourgeois-democratic’ rights, including the right 
of national self-determination, the Vietnamese declaration was highlighting 
the ‘contradiction’ between French colonialism and American anti-
colonialism. By then going on to quote from the French ‘Declaration of the 
Rights of Man and the Citizen’ that was issued at the beginning of the 
French Revolution in 1789, the Vietnamese declaration was drawing 
attention to the ‘contradiction’ between the stated ‘bourgeois-democratic’ 
values of the French Republic, and its colonial practice. Whereas de Gaulle 
had stated that ‘France claimed the right to recover its sovereignty over 
Indochina’, the declaration argued that ‘our people have seized back 
Vietnam from the hands of the Japanese, not the French’, then went on to 
abrogate ‘all colonial relations’ with France, all treaties signed between 
France and Vietnam, all ‘special privileges’ of France on Vietnamese 
territory. 
 The Vietnamese Declaration of Independence was thus a profoundly 
Marxist-Leninist document. Unlike other declarations of independence, it 
did not appeal to the ‘inherent’ values of the Vietnamese people, or invoke 
the idea that the Vietnamese nation had some kind of unchanging core 
identity or ‘soul’ that was being redeemed. Rather, the declaration reflected 
the fact that independence was considered as just part of a long-term 
dialectical process that had a vital international dimension, in which the 
declaration could play a pragmatic role.42  
 
The Việt Minh theme of national unity and independence, however, 
captured the hearts and minds of virtually all Vietnamese. August 1945 had 
been in the first instance a giant outpouring of emotion, and only 
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secondarily a well-engineered seizure of power. Thrilled by the nation’s 
independence, the people took part in the festival of revolution, joining 
demonstrations, chanting slogans, cheering government representatives, 
mocking or abusing enemies, electing committees, participating in work 
brigades and literacy classes. A great deal of this activity was spontaneous, in 
the sense that individuals or small groups took the initiative on the basis of 
what they thought the revolution was all about, not in response to 
instructions from above. In a hundred different ways people indicated how 
the world had been turned upside down – burning local administrative 
records, jailing former mandarins or police agents, flouting old laws, appro-
priating government property, et cetera. Writing retrospectively, Vietnamese 
historians could thus conclude that the outcome of the Revolution of 
August 1945, the crest of a conquering, irresistible swell, depended upon the 
strengths of the leadership and local organization of the Việt Minh, capable 
through the formulation of their national discourse of ‘leading the popular 
masses in a multiform struggle and defining for the nation and its diverse 
social classes a precise program and definite prospects for the future.43
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